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THE ECONOMICS OF THE EMPLOYMENT






Since its July 26, 1992 effective date, the implementation and effec-
tiveness of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("Title I")
has been the subject of intense debate among employers, courts,
policymakers, academics, and persons with and without disabilities.'
Supporters of the law stress the overarching importance of the civil
rights guaranteed by Title I's antidiscrimination provisions. Critics
cast the law as overly broad, difficult to interpret, inefficient, and as a
preferential treatment initiative. Others question whether the law's
economic benefits to employers, to persons with disabilities, and to
society outweigh its administrative burdens. These and related issues
have fueled the debate, some argue a backlash, of Title I.
This Article examines one aspect of the ongoing evaluation and de-
bate regarding Title I implementation, that is, arguments based pri-
marily in economics.2 Presently, there exists limited systematic
empirical study of Title I implementation in general, and of the eco-
nomic impact of the law on employers and others in particular. This
lack of study hinders accurate analysis and interpretation of Title I by
* Professor of Law, of Preventive Medicine, and of Psychology, University of Iowa; Director,
Law, Health Policy and Disability Center; Ph.D., 1982, Harvard University; J.D., 1986, Stanford
University Law School. I thank Heidi Berven, Steve Burton, Ken Kress, Mollie Marti, Robert
Olick, and Randall Thomas for their insightful comments on the issues discussed in this Article.
This Article is based on a presentation given on January 31, 1997, at DePaul Law Review's
Symposium entitled Individual Rights and Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act.
1. For a review, see Peter D. Blanck & Mollie W. Marti, Attitudes, Behavior, and the Employ-
ment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997)
(developing related aspects of the present article).
2. The Article attempts to examine the economic implications of Title I in ways consistent
with prior cost-benefit analysis of the law suggested by economists. As mentioned in Part II of
the Article, however, this approach is not meant to suggest that other disciplinary or nonu-
tilitarian views of the law are less valid or useful for assessing the impact of the law on employ-
ers, persons with disabilities, or society. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
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both proponents and critics of the law.3 Part I of this Article examines
the major economic justifications and critiques of Title I, in light of
existing empirical information on the law's implementation. Part II of
this Article explores the economics of workplace accommodations re-
quired under Title I, in particular as reflective of efficient business
practices with applications to persons with and without disabilities.
I. ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF TITLE I
There are several economic efficiency justifications linked to the
provisions of Title I, each of which may be cast in support or opposi-
tion to the purposes of the law and which may impact in significant
and measurable ways the American economy. This Part examines
these views with reference to the central provisions of the law and the
existing, but limited, empirical study.4 The implications explored re-
late to the following propositions that are open to empirical
verification:
1. Definition of Disability. Title I's statutory definition of disability
affects the value of labor in the American work force;
2. Qualified Individual with a Disability. Title I affects employers'
ability to hire and retain "qualified" employees and to define essential
job functions and production requirements and, thereby, employers'
labor market efficiencies;
3. Reasonable Accommodations. Title I impacts employers' deci-
sions to provide effective and economically efficient "accommoda-
tions" for job applicants and employees with and without disabilities;
and
4. Undue Hardship. Title I's economic impact varies for employers
of different sizes and in different labor markets.
A. Definition of Disability
Proponents and critics of Title I argue that the statutory definition
of disability impacts, in either economically efficient or inefficient
ways, the "value" of labor to employers in different segments of the
3. See NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE: THE CHALLENGE
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY-A DECADE OF PROGRESS IN DISABILITY POLICY SETTING AN
AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE 6 (1996) (recommending that accurate data about people with disa-
bilities be collected, analyzed, and ,reported).
4. For a prior discussion of the provisions of Title I, see Peter D. Blanck, Employment Integra-
tion, Economic Opportunity, and the Americans with Disabilities Act: Empirical Study from
1990-1993, 79 IOWA L. REV. 853 (1994).
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American work force.5 In a truly competitive labor market, the value
to an employer of a worker's labor should equal or exceed the
worker's wage.6 Nevertheless, as Professor Donohue has suggested, a
worker's value is often contingent upon a worker's output and his em-
ployer's and relevant consumers' attitudes about him.7 Thus, to a
given employer, worker value may equal output or productivity plus a
degree of attitudinal preference, or conversely disfavoring discrimina-
tion, toward the particular worker.8
Worker value is linked also to relevant labor market biases or cus-
tomer attitudes and preferences. A particular geographic market may
have a high percentage of persons with disabilities, the elderly, or
others who value or require physical accessibility to retail establish-
ments. This demand may lead to a preference by these individuals to
shop at accessible stores, in addition to the hiring by the stores of
individuals with similar needs as those in the relevant market.9 In
such a market there may be increased value to employers (for exam-
ple, greater profits) associated with retaining workers and serving cus-
tomers with disabilities.
In a series of empirical studies discussed in greater detail in Part II
below, my colleagues and I have illustrated how an employer's sensi-
tivity to disability-related preferences and customer attitudes may
lead to enhanced economic efficiency for a particular business.10 Pro-
5. Worker "value" may be assessed in terms of the net dollar profit to employers of hiring or
retaining a worker in a given labor market. See John J. Donohue III, Employment Discrimina-
tion Law in Perspective: Three Concepts of Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2585 (1994) (noting
the implicit conception of equality that "a worker's wage should equal the market-determined
value of the individual's labor").
6. See Frederick C. Collignon, The Role of Reasonable Accommodation in Employing Dis-
abled Persons in Private Industry, in DIsABILrrY AND THE LABOR MARKET 196, 205-11 (Monroe
Berkowitz & M. Anne Hill eds., 2d ed. 1989) (stating that "[t]he wage to be paid the worker
would, in a competitive labor market, be equal to the worker's marginal contribution to the
value of the firm's product"); Donohue, supra note 5, at 2585.
7. See Donohue, supra note 5, at 2585 (defining this concept as "contingent equality").
8. Cf. William G. Johnson, The Future of Disability Policy: Benefit Payments or Civil Rights?,
549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 160,164 (1997) (arguing that labor market discrimina-
tion against persons with disabilities results more from inadequate information regarding their
productivity than from prejudice and that Title I defines worker value to employers in terms of
productive use of resources).
9. See, e.g., Bill Wolfe, Shopping Trip-Ups: How Accessible Are Local Stores to People with
Disabilities?, COURIER-JOURNAL, Dec. 23, 1996, at 01E (linking retail store accessibility to shop-
ping preference by consumers with disabilities).
10. See PETER D. BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT,
TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-Up REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND Co., AN-
NENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM REPORT (1996) [hereinafter SEARS II]; PETER D. BLANCK,
COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: A
CASE REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND Co., ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM REPORT
(1994) [hereinafter SEARS I].
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ponents of Title I argue that the antidiscrimination law promotes eco-
nomic equality in employment, whether defined in terms of wages or
career opportunities, and confronts attitudinal preferences and unjus-
tified discrimination that is faced by qualified employees and job ap-
plicants with disabilities in different labor markets.'1
Under Title I's three-prong definition of "disability," a person with
a disability covered by the law must have a known physical or mental
condition or impairment that "substantially limits major life activi-
ties,"112 "a record of" a physical or mental condition,13 or is "regarded
as" having such an impairment.1 4 The first prong of the definition of
disability is directed toward individuals with actual and substantial im-
pairments or conditions, such as those with visual or hearing impair-
ments, cancer, mental illness, physical paralysis, or HIV. This prong
employs a functional definition of disability that is determined on a
case-by-case basis.15 The first-prong definition of disability is not only
based on the diagnosis of the impairment but also on the effect of the
impairment on the individual's life.16 Physical characteristics, such as
hair color or left-handedness, and temporary conditions, however, are
not covered disabilities, nor are an individual's economic, environ-
mental, or cultural disadvantages.' 7
11. In Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the United States Supreme Court recognized
that discrimination against people with disabilities is "most often the product, not of invidious
animus," but rather of thoughtless and indifferent attitudes. Id. at 295. See generally MARTHA
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE (1990) (describing the benefits of reshaping societal
perceptions of disabled persons).
12. Major life activities include "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1996). A "substan-
tial" limit on the major life activity of working means the individual is significantly restricted in
the ability to perform a class of job activities as compared to an average person with comparable
training, skills, and ability. Id. § 1630.2j)(3)(i).
13. A record of disability means that one "has a history of, or has been misclassified as having,
a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." Id.
§ 1630.2(k). An employer must rely on the record of disability in making employment-related
decisions to be held liable under Title 1. Id. § 1630.2(k) app. at 341.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). Title I also prohibits discrimination on the basis of an associ-
ation with a person with a disability. Id. § 12112(b)(4). To help evaluate the meaning of discrim-
ination under Title 1, the EEOC has issued interpretative guidance. See EEOC Compl. Man.
(BNA) § 902 (Mar. 5, 1995) (defining the term "disability").
15. See ROBERT L. BURGDORF, JR., DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 129-
30 (1995) (noting that disability is not necessarily based on name or diagnosis of impairment, but
rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual).
16. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20) app. at 339; cf. Murphy v. United Postal Serv., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881-
82 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding high blood pressure impairment that is controlled by medication not a
covered disability).
17. See BURGDORF, supra note 15, at 145-46 (noting several conditions expressly excluded
from coverage as a disability, including transvestism, homosexuality, and illegal drug use).
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Under the first prong of the definition, disability is interpreted to
mean that the individual is substantially limited in a major life activity,
for instance, in the ability to work in a class or range of jobs.' 8 Find-
ings from the 1992 National Health Interview Survey show that
nineteen million working-age adults, roughly twelve percent of the
population between the ages of eighteen and sixty-nine years old, are
restricted in the major life activity of working.19
The first-prong definition of disability does not mean that a covered
individual must work at the job of his choice. 20 Rather, to fall under
the first-prong definition, the individual's "access" to the relevant la-
bor market must be substantially limited by the impairment or condi-
tion.21 Put differently, an individual's failure to qualify for one job in
a given labor market, even because of a substantial impairment or
condition, does not necessarily mean that the individual has a covered
disability for purposes of Title I analysis.22 A court must still assess
whether the individual's impairment or condition creates a significant
barrier to employment or to a particular labor market.23 Factors con-
sidered in determining whether an impairment substantially limits the
major life activity of work and is, therefore, a covered disability, in-
clude the individual's access to a geographic area, the number and
type of jobs requiring similar training or skills (for example, the class
of jobs in the relevant labor market), and the number and type of jobs
18. See, e.g., Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that an
individual did not have a covered disability when incapable of satisfying demands of particular
job); Gordon v. Hamm, 100 F.3d 907, 912 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that while side effects of
chemotherapy treatment may be an impairment, the side effects did not substantially limit an
individual to work in a class of jobs or in a broad range of jobs in various classes).
19. See STEVE KAYE, DISABILITY WATCH: STATUS REPORT ON THE CONDITION OF PEOPLE
WITH DISABILITIES 2 (Disability Rights Advocates and Disability Statistics Center (Dec. 19,
1996)) (on file with the DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter DISABILITY WATCH] (noting that more
than half of this group-10.9 million people-report that they are unable to work). For exten-
sive analysis of factors related to work limitation, see MITCHELL P. LAPLANTE & D. CARLSON,
DISABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES: PREVALENCE AND CAUSES, 1992 (Disability Statistics Re-
port No. 7: U.S. Dept. Ed., Nat'l Institute Disability Research 1996).
20. See, e.g., Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
major life activity of working does not necessarily mean working at the job of one's choice);
Welsh v. City of Tulsa, Okla., 977 F.2d 1415, 1417 (10th Cir. 1992) (same); see also Weiler, 101
F.3d at 524-25 (holding that an individual did not have a covered disability when she was incapa-
ble of working under a particular supervisor because of anxiety or stress related to job review).
21. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. Co., 5 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1220, 1226 (N.D. Ill.
1996) (noting that impairment excluded individual from a wide variety of jobs at employer in
question). However, an individual may show a substantial limitation on a major life activity
other than working and thereby be a covered person with a disability. BURGDORF, supra note
15, at 156-57.
22. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1996) (stating that the inability to perform a single, partic-
ular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working).
23. See Joslyn, 5 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 1225 (citing cases in support).
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not requiring similar training and skills (for example, the range of sim-
ilar jobs in the relevant labor market). 24
The access to labor market test associated with the first prong of the
definition of disability suggests that in cases where an employer fails
to hire a job applicant with an actual impairment that forecloses the
individual from working within a broad range of jobs in an industry or
in a large company (for example, a blind person or a person with
mental retardation), that individual may have a disability under the
first prong of the statutory definition.25 This determination alone,
however, does not indicate that the individual is qualified to perform
the job in question. Rather, the test focuses on whether the individ-
ual's access to the relevant labor market or job is limited due to the
substantial nature of his impairment. If limited access to the relevant
labor market is demonstrated, then the individual may be disabled for
purposes of Title I analysis. A subsequent determination is required
to determine whether the individual is qualified for the job and
whether the employer discriminated against him because of his
disability.26
Unlike the first prong, the second and third prongs of the definition
of disability (that is, "record of" and "regarded as" having an impair-
ment) are meant to prevent employment discrimination on the basis
of biased attitudes toward individuals with perceived, yet often pres-
ently asymptomatic, conditions (for example, persons with a history of
cancer or mental illness).27 As mentioned above, a worker's value in a
discriminatory market is sometimes heavily contingent upon the
worker's output and his employer's, relevant co-workers', or consum-
ers' preferential or discriminatory attitudes about the worker.28
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii).
25. See Joslyn, 5 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 1226 (citing Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d
17, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1993)); EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 917 F. Supp. 1164, 1169 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
27. An example of a case involving all three prongs is Joslyn, where the plaintiff contended he
was qualified for the job, was regarded as a person with carpal tunnel syndrome, had a record of
this impairment that substantially limited his major life activity of working, and was denied em-
ployment on that basis. Joslyn, 5 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 1224.
28. See Donohue, supra note 5, at 2585 (defining this concept as "contingent equality"). Ar-
guably, all labor markets are discriminatory in that they reflect, in part, preferences of the rele-
vant employers. Discrimination in labor markets prohibited by Title I, however, is meant to
prevent unjustified disfavor or prejudice toward the protected class of covered and qualified
individuals with disabilities, for instance, to prevent employment decisions that are not related to
worker qualifications and that are based on negative attitudes toward an individual's disability.
See Marjorie L. Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve Its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 37, 43 (1997) (defining prejudice towards persons with disabilities);
Johnson, supra note 8, at 161 (same).
[Vol. 46:877
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In a situation where an employment action is made because of a
worker's perceived disability and not on output, that is, not on the
worker's actual qualifications, the value of the worker to the employer
is distorted in a discriminatory manner.29 This distortion and, in the
aggregate, related market failure may be reflected in lower wages to
the discriminated against employee or in loss of equal job opportunity.
The goal of Title I is to enable qualified workers with perceived disa-
bilities to receive the actual "value of their labor in a nondiscrimina-
tory environment. '30
Analysis of issues associated with employers' attitudes about per-
ceived and "hidden" disabilities (that is, conditions that are not imme-
diately obvious, such as Tourette's Syndrome or epilepsy) serves
several purposes related to the analysis of the statutory definition of
disability and its relation to the assessment of the value of labor in the
work force. First, studies suggest that increasing numbers of individu-
als with perceived disabilities are entering the work force and are de-
nied equal employment opportunity on the basis of biased attitudes
and prejudice about their impairments. 31 Some studies find that the
most common health impairments associated with disability are "hid-
den" conditions.32
Second, the study of attitudes toward persons with hidden or per-
ceived disabilities is illustrative of underlying biases and discrimina-
tion unrelated to actual worker value in the relevant labor market. 33
Thus, diminished worker value reflected in lower wages for compara-
ble work is not related to actual output or to customers' preferences
because of unfounded attitudinal discrimination (for example, biased
attitudes toward individuals with physical disfigurements). 34 Unlike
29. Title I imposes liability for discrimination whenever the prohibited motivation based on
disability affects the employer's decision, that is, "when it is a 'but-for' cause." See McNely v.
Ocala Star Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1073-75 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a literal reli-
ance on the phrase "solely" by reason of disability leads to results inconsistent with congres-
sional intent).
30. Donohue, supra note 5, at 2586 (defining this concept under a Title VII analysis as "intrin-
sic equality").
31. See, e.g., DIsABILrry WATCH, supra note 19, at 3-4 (finding that the most common health
impairments associated with disability are "hidden" conditions, and persons with "hidden disa-
bilities," such as those with mental impairments, encounter severe attitudinal bias in the
workplace).
32. See, e.g., id. at 3.
33. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 1 (reviewing research on attitudes about disability).
34. See Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minor-
ity Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 41 (1996); Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
19971
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
race or gender employment discrimination, the protected characteris-
tics associated with hidden or perceived disabilities may not be imme-
diately obvious to the employer, either at the time of hiring or during
employment (for example, if the worker is injured on the job).35 Atti-
tudinal bias may be reflected in unconscious or unstated negative
views of a worker's ability to perform a job, even though the individ-
ual with a perceived disability may be presently asymptomatic and
qualified to perform the job in question.36 Resultant discrimination
by an employer based on animus toward a qualified individual with a
perceived disability may result in a loss of productivity or economic
value to the employer.37
A hypothetical case involving the "regarded as" prong of the defini-
tion of disability might involve a qualified asymptomatic individual
being denied an employment opportunity because of the employer's
negative attitudes toward that individual's predisposition for cancer,
genetic illness, HIV, psychiatric illness, or any other recognized im-
pairment. In these situations, discriminatory and biased attitudes
would impact employment decisions rather than an obvious impair-
ment affecting the actual market value of the individual's labor.38
From an economic standpoint, an employer would not be allowed
under Title I to consider a presently qualified worker's future lost
value or decreased output from actual, yet asymptomatic or perceived,
35. See Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing similarity
between nonobvious nature of religious discrimination and disability discrimination in cases in-
volving hidden disabilities).
36. See, e.g., Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1369-70 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (describing perva-
sive discrimination persons with disabilities have experienced on the purported ground that
"others would feel uncomfortable around them"); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEOPLE
wiTH DISABILITIES: FEDERAL PROGRAMS COULD WORK TOGETHER MORE EFFICIENTLY To
PROMOTE EMPLOYMENT, GAO/HEHS-96-126, at 4 (1996) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (noting
attitudinal bias toward people with psychiatric disabilities includes labeling as unemployable).
37. See John J. Donohue III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimina-
tion Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1601-02 (1992) (arguing that productivity gains or economic
value to employers may be enhanced if antidiscrimination employment laws succeed in reducing
such attitudinal discrimination and suggesting that the economic benefits of even small gains in
worker productivity may largely offset the direct or indirect costs associated with implementa-
tion of the particular antidiscrimination law).
38. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 95 F.3d 1285, 1295-96 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that plain-
tiff believed he was discriminated against when his boss terminated him because she panicked
upon learning he was HIV positive and not because of poor performance). According to EEOC
regulatory guidance, in certain situations, the access to labor market test may not apply to analy-
sis of the second and third prong definition of disability; that is, an individual could be covered
under these parts of the definition regardless of whether the employer's attitudes "were shared
by others in the field .... " See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. at 341-42 (1996) (protecting those
discriminated against on the basis of attitudes about disability).
[Vol. 46:877
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impairments, such as genetic illness or HIV, in making hiring- or em-
ployment-related decisions.39
Title I's three-prong definition of disability is consistent with prior
conceptions of employment equality that aim to ensure that "a
worker's wage should equal the market-determined value of the indi-
vidual's labor. '40 The access to labor market test, increasingly
adopted by courts, reflects a high standard to be met by plaintiffs in
Title I employment discrimination cases brought under the first prong
of the definition of disability. It is arguable that plaintiffs must meet
this high standard because the test is meant to ensure that Title I's
definition of disability does not distort the value of labor to employers
or alter their rational labor market behavior. Likewise, an employer's
negative attitudes about people with actual or perceived disabilities do
not alone constitute unjustified discrimination under Title I unless
these attitudes form the basis for subsequent discriminatory behavior
toward "qualified" individuals.41 Proof of the link between discrimi-
natory attitudes and behavior, or "discriminatory animus," toward a
qualified individual with a covered disability is an essential element of
a Title I case.42
Employment decisions based on perceptions of an employee's per-
sonality problems, such as a short temper or poor judgment in the
workplace, are not prohibited by Title I if the underlying impairment
is not "regarded as" a covered disability.43 For instance, an employee
39. See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text (noting approach also consistent with thrust
of Health Insurance Reform Act of 1996).
40. Donohue, supra note 5, at 2585.
41. See, e.g., Gordon v. E.L. Hamm & Assoc., Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 912-13 (11th Cir. 1996)
(stating that as with actual impairments, a perceived impairment must be substantially limiting
and significant, presumably perceived to substantially limit an individual to work in a class of
jobs).
42. See Johnson v. Boardman Petroleum, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1563, 1569 (S.D. Ga. 1996) (noting
that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title I, a plaintiff must show that the
decision to terminate was causally connected to the employer's discrimination against a disabil-
ity). There are several forms of employment discrimination under Title I. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112
(1994) (defining the term "discriminate"). Discrimination against a qualified individual with a
covered disability because of that disability may result in a claim for "disparate treatment" (that
is, other similarly situated nondisabled employees are treated more favorably). Id. In some
cases, where there is no direct proof of such discrimination, employees may use a burden-shifting
method (that is, the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting test) to prove indirectly that an em-
ployer fired a qualified employee because of his disability. See, e.g., Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne
Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1286 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the burden-shifting test in Title
I context using direct or indirect evidence of discrimination). In addition, Title I discrimination
may be based independently on an employer's failure to make reasonable accommodations for a
qualified job applicant or employee with a covered disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B).
43. See, e.g., Fenton v. Pritchard, 926 F. Supp. 1437, 1444-45 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that the
plaintiff's violent nature and short temper were not impairments under Title t); Pouncy v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566, 1580 n.8 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (commenting that character flaws,
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may allege employment discrimination in circumstances where the ap-
propriateness of that employee's workplace behavior is at issue." In
one such case, an employee who was terminated for inappropriate and
threatening behavior toward a fellow employee was deemed not quali-
fied and thereby not entitled to Title I protections. 45 The employee
contended unsuccessfully that his behavior toward co-workers led his
employer to perceive him as a covered person with a mental disabil-
ity.46 Cases of this type suggest that an employer's negative attitudes
toward an employee resulting in an adverse employment decision still
must be based on defined disabilities that fall under the purview of the
law.
In addition, employment discrimination under Title I will not be
found where the employer does not "know" of, perceive, or treat an
employee's impairment as a substantial limitation on the employee's
present ability to work.47 Thus, an employer's economic or humanita-
rian decision to grant a leave, educational or vocational training, or
other workplace accommodations to a worker are not indicative of
that employer's perceptions of a defined disability.48 Likewise, an em-
ployer's decision not to hire an individual with an impairment for a
position does not demonstrate that it perceives the employee as dis-
poor judgment, irresponsible behavior, and lack of impulse control are not necessarily impair-
ments under Title 1); Greenberg v. New York, 919 F. Supp. 637, 642 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (same).
44. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 1.
45. Fenton, 926 F. Supp. at 1445-46. Negative case examples such as Fenton have been used by
critics to suggest inefficiencies in Title I implementation. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 1
(noting other negative case examples). The representativeness of such cases to Title I implemen-
tation in practice is open to debate and study.
46. Fenton, 926 F. Supp. at 1445-46.
47. Johnson, 923 F. Supp. at 1569; see also Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding that an issue of material fact existed as to perceived disability claim where em-
ployer called employee into two meetings to discuss his "aberrational behavior," asked him if he
had problems, and encouraged him to seek counseling); Stewart v. County of Brown, 86 F.3d
107, 111 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting employee did not make valid perceived disability claim even
though employer thought he was excitable, ordered numerous psychological evaluations for him,
and stated to third persons that he considered the employee to be emotionally and psychologi-
cally imbalanced because the employer repeatedly was advised that the employee was mentally
fit for his job); EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. Co., 5 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 1220 (N.D. 111. 1996)
(finding a genuine issue of fact existed where employer contended it did not treat plaintiff's
carpal tunnel syndrome as an impairment that substantially limited his ability to work at one job
in the plant and that plaintiff was not disqualified from a class of other jobs).
48. See Johnson, 923 F. Supp. at 1569. A related question involves the extent to which Title I
lawsuits on the basis of perceived disability conflict with other policy concerns underlying the
law, such as the goal to encourage employers to humanize their relationships with their employ-
ees. Id.; see infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text (noting that businesses are increasingly
investing in accommodations for workers with and without disabilities).
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abled for purposes of Title I analysis, regardless of whether an accom-
modation is required. 49
B. Qualified Individual with a Disability
Proponents and critics of Title I argue that the law affects employ-
ers' ability to hire and retain "qualified" employees and thereby dis-
torts labor market efficiencies. Some critics of the law contend that
Title I implementation has resulted in economic waste and ineffi-
ciency, declines in productivity, and reverse discrimination toward
qualified individuals without disabilities.50 These arguments often are
made by analogy to alleged market inefficiencies associated with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 implementation involving issues of
race and gender.51
An individual with a disability is "qualified" for purposes of Title I
if he satisfies the prerequisites for the job, such as educational back-
ground or employment experience, and can perform essential job
functions.52 The concept of a "qualified individual" with a disability is
central to the analysis of the link between improper discriminatory
attitudes and behavior, as well as to the portrayal of the economic
implications of Title I.53
49. See Josyln, 5 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) at 1225 ("[The] test for whether a perceived
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is not whether the employer's rejection of the
applicant was due to a good faith, narrowly-based decision that the applicant's characteristics did
not match specific job requirements. Rather, the proper test is whether the impairment, as per-
ceived, would affect the individual's ability to find work across a class of jobs or a broad range of
jobs in various classes."); Barnes v. Cochran, 944 F. Supp. 897, 901 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (noting that
the fact that an employer finds an applicant unqualified does not mean that it did not perceive
applicant as disabled).
50. See, e.g., Walter Y. Oi, Employment and Benefits for People with Diverse Disabilities, in
DISABILITY, WORK AND CASH BENEFITS 103 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) (noting that the
ADA has not produced anticipated growth in employment).
51. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTU-
NITY: LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 137, 143 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994)
(concluding that the theoretical attack on the efficiency of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is incomplete); Paula England, Neoclassical Economists' Theories of Discrimination, in
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC POLICY
59, 67 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994) (examining theory that most employment discrimination will
disappear in competitive labor markets); Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and Efficacy of Title
VII, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY 147, 148 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994) (concluding that Title VII is not efficient or economi-
cally justified).
52. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), (n) (1996); cf. Hegwer v. Board of Civil Serv. Comm'rs of City of
Los Angeles, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 396 (Ct. App. 1992) (finding that a paramedic whose thyroid
condition caused excessive weight gain was not a qualified employee because she exceeded the
body-fat-based weight standards for fire fighters and emergency medical technicians which were
reasonable means of insuring the health and safety of both employees and the public).
53. Blanck, supra note 4, at 864-65.
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Title I does not require an employer to hire or retain individuals
with covered disabilities who are not qualified or to hire or retain indi-
viduals with covered disabilities over equally or more qualified indi-
viduals without disabilities.54 Employers are not discouraged from
searching for the most qualified individuals with or without disabili-
ties.5 5 Nor are employers required to incur burdensome efficiency or
productivity losses or opportunity costs, whether defined in terms of
economic value in the relevant labor market or in retaining unquali-
fied workers with or without covered disabilities.5 6
Title I's "qualified individual" requirement is meant to ensure that
the value of a worker's labor or productivity should equal or exceed
the worker's wage in a given labor market.5 7 Workers with covered
disabilities are not deemed "equal" by their Title I status to workers
without disabilities, nor are they provided preferential treatment in
any aspect of employment. The goal of the qualified individual provi-
sion is to ensure that a worker with a disability who can perform legiti-
mate essential job functions, with or without a reasonable
accommodation, receives wages or other compensation that are com-
parable to his labor market value.
Critics of Title I argue that the definition of employee qualifications
artificially constrains employers' ability to define employees' job func-
tions and production requirements, thereby producing economic inef-
ficiencies.5 8 Yet in establishing employment qualifications (that is,
educational background requirements or essential job functions), Title
I only requires that the applicant's or employee's skills are to be con-
sidered independent of the purported disability, in other words, in-
dependent of unfounded attitudes about the relation of a disability to
current job qualifications or of views about the efficacy or cost of an
accommodation for a qualified individual with a disability. Employers
are free to determine legitimate essential job functions or production
requirements as they see fit. 59
54. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
55. Cf. Oi, supra note 50, at 112.
56. The relation among job qualifications, essential job functions and Title I's requirement
that employers provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals is discussed below.
See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
57. See Donohue, supra note 5, at 2584-85.
58. See, e.g., Mark A. Schuman, The Wheelchair Ramp to Serfdom: The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, Liberty, and Markets, 10 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT 495, 496 (1995) ("[T]he
ADA denies an employer the right to determine the qualifications and abilities relevant to a
job.").
59. See infra notes 130-45 and accompanying text (discussing the costs and benefits to employ-
ers associated with the provision of reasonable accommodations).
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Several trends in Title I case law support the view that the qualified
individual provision of Title I has served to ensure that a worker with
a covered disability who can perform essential or fundamental job
functions receives a wage that is comparable to his labor market
value. First, as mentioned, employers are not required to alter pro-
duction standards or to shape a job for an individual with a disabil-
ity.60 Employers must maintain legitimate job requirements, however,
as compared to those that are a "subterfuge" or pretext to exclude
people with disabilities from equal employment.
As Professor Burgdorf has noted, "[e]mployers retain the preroga-
tive ... to determine what particular jobs need to be performed in
their businesses and to establish the functions of those jobs."'61 Thus,
Congress did not intend for Title I to interfere with employers' non-
discriminatory, rational economic decision making.62 Nevertheless,
businesses of different sizes or with varying degrees of specialization
have different needs with regard to the range of essential functions
required of a particular worker. Such economies-of-scale questions
are examined under the law on a case-by-case basis, which may have
led to initial uncertainty by the small business community about im-
plementation of Title 1.63
Second, as discussed below in the context of Title I's "undue hard-
ship" provision, restructuring job functions as an accommodation to a
covered individual with a disability may or may not cause an employer
an economic undue hardship (that is, inefficiencies due to a funda-
mental alteration of the required job), depending upon relative costs
and benefits associated with the specialization of the task, the size and
nature of the business, the availability of worker substitutes in the rel-
evant labor market, or cyclical changes in the market or economy that
60. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
61. Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 192. Title I distinguishes between essential and marginal job
functions. Marginal functions are those incidental job requirements that are not necessary to the
central performance of the job in question. Id. Employers may not exclude a qualified individ-
ual with a covered disability from employment on the basis of inability to perform marginal job
functions. Many Title I cases involve the extent to which a particular job function is essential or
marginal. Written job descriptions typically are used as evidence of essential functions. 42
U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
62. Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Congress intended
simply that disabled persons have the same opportunities available to them as are available to
nondisabled persons.").
63. The requirements of Title I affect businesses with 15 or more employees. See Peter D.
Blanck, The Emerging Work Force: Empirical Study of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16 J.
CORP. L. 693, 772 n.330, 778-79 (1991) (finding little difference in attitudes of small and large
businesses toward the employment of persons with disabilities, including views of low costs of
workplace accommodations).
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affect labor and production requirements. 64 The determination of the
essential or nonessential nature of job functions also is made on a
case-by-case basis.
Third, persons with actual, hidden, or perceived disabilities may be
deemed "unqualified" for a job in circumstances in which they are
shown to pose a direct safety or health threat to themselves or others
in the workplace, regardless of their ability to perform essential job
functions. 65 Factors considered in determining whether a direct threat
exists include the duration of the risk, the nature of potential harm,
and the likelihood that the harm will occur.66 Employers are required
to make an individualized and objective determination of direct threat
based on the employee's present ability to perform safely essential job
functions. This determination must be made on the basis of tests of
current medical judgment67 and not on anticipated lost productivity or
predictions about the future impact of a disabling condition.
Fourth, pre- and post-employment inquiries regarding medical his-
tory or disability have been the subject of controversy in employment
discrimination lawsuits involving the assessment of the qualifications
of persons with different disabilities.68 Title I prohibits disability-re-
lated pre-employment inquiries and medical tests, but such examina-
64. Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 210; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)( 2) (listing factors relevant
to undue hardship determination).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996) (defining direct threat as a "sig-
nificant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be
eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodation"); see also 28 C.F.R § 36.208 (1996) (not-
ing that Title I may require accommodations that eliminate or sufficiently reduce a direct threat);
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (noting that where a disability is involved, the employer must identify the
specific behavior on the part of the individual that would pose a direct threat, considering the
duration, nature and severity, likelihood of harm and imminence of harm of the disability).
66. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r).
67. Id.; see also Jean Campbell & Caroline L. Kaufmann, Equality and Difference in the ADA:
Unintended Consequences for Employment of People with Mental Health Disabilities, in MENTAL
DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 221, 225-26 (Richard J. Bonnie & John Monahan
eds., 1997) (stating that the direct threat standard balances rights of persons with disabilities
against the needs of society to prevent harm); cf. Oi, supra note 50, at 107-08, 112-13 (discussing
the impact of a disability on worker productivity and noting that "disability steals time").
68. See, e.g., Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, Inc., 70 F.3d 667, 675 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that
the employer did not violate the ADA where it inquired into ability of job applicant, former
employee, with known psychological disability, to function effectively in the workplace and to
get along with co-workers and supervisor, or where employer required applicant to provide med-
ical information as to the ability to return to work with or without an accommodation and type
of accommodation necessary); see Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 484 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that a university's-analogous to an employer's-medical determination of
whether an individual is medically qualified, if reasonable, must be given deference by the
court).
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tions are permitted after a conditional job offer has been made.69
Medically related employment tests, if used by an employer, must be
administered to all employees regardless of disability and, with limited
exceptions, the information obtained must be treated as
confidential.70
Medical test results from a post-conditional offer of employment, or
medical test results obtained during employment, may not be used to
exclude a qualified individual with a covered disability from the job
unless the exclusion is job-related, consistent with business necessity,
and not amenable to reasonable accommodation. 71 If an employee
alleges discrimination based on an employer's medical test that pur-
ports to screen out qualified individuals with disabilities, the employer
may rebut the claim by showing that the test accurately measures job
skills that are consistent with business necessity, such as workplace
safety or security requirements. 72
D. Reasonable Accommodations
The economic implication that has received the most attention in-
volves Title I's effect on employers' ability to provide workplace ac-
commodations for qualified job applicants and employees with
disabilities. As discussed above, an employer may legitimately shape
an employee's work or production requirements as long as those re-
quirements are job-related and not a pretext for discrimination against
covered persons with disabilities.73 The employer's right to structure
jobs, however, may not violate Title I's requirement that the employer
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, No. 915.002, EN-
FORCEMENT GUIDANCE: PREEMPLOYMENT DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL Ex-
AMINATIONS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990 36 (1994) [hereinafter
EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE]; see also Susan Alexander, Preemployment Inquiries and Ex-
amination: What Employers Need To Know About the New EEOC Guidelines, 45 LAB. L.J. 667,
678 (1994); Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Employer Screening Procedures Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: What's Legal? What's Debatable?, in CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECH-
NIQUES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 285, 290 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Mar. 2, 1996), available
in Westlaw, C106 ALI-ABA 285; David M. Katz, Disability Queries Okay After Offering Job, 16
NAT'L UNDERWRITER (PROP. & CASUALTY/RISK BENEFITS MGMT. ED.), JUNE 17, 1996, at 31
(discussing the window of opportunity for employers to ask about job applicants' disabilities
after offers are made).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A)(B).
71. Id. § 12112(c)(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(3) (1996).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 883 (D.
Kan. 1996) (finding Department of Transportation driving qualification standards a complete
defense to plaintiff's Title I claim); see also Kimberli R. Black, Personality Screening in Employ-
ment, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 69, 113-15 (1994) (discussing methods to satisfy job-relatedness require-
ment that screening test validly relates to the job at issue).
73. Black, supra note 72, at 113-15.
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provide "reasonable accommodations" for a qualified employee with
a covered disability.74
An accommodation is a modification or adjustment to a workplace
process or environment that makes it possible for a qualified person
with a disability to perform essential job functions, such as physical
modifications to a work space, flexible scheduling of duties, or provi-
sion of assistive technologies to aid in job performance. 75 To be eligi-
ble for an accommodation, an employee must make his disability
"known" 76 to the employer and request an accommodation. This re-
quirement places a particular burden on an individual with a hidden
and nonobvious disability to disclose in a timely manner the claimed
disability and request the employer to provide an accommodation.77
Once the request is made, the employer retains the right to choose the
accommodation, as long as it is effective and the employee has a good
faith opportunity to participate in the process. 78 An employee is not
74. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o); Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act. The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. LAW 201, 219-23 (1993).
75. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (providing that a qualified employee may request rea-
sonable accommodation such as being transferred to a vacant and similar position with the
employer). Compare Overton v. Reilly, 977 F.2d 1190, 1195 (7th Cir. 1992) (approving accom-
modation for chemist with depression of restricting job to decrease contact with public where
contact with public occupied 5% of employees time), Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90, 92 (8th
Cir. 1991) (finding when employee with apraxia, a neurological disorder characterized by disrup-
tions in concentration, performs satisfactorily when placed in a semi-private work space, the
employer must take reasonable efforts to provide a "distraction-free environment"), and Kent v.
Derwinski, 790 F. Supp. 1032, 1040 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (requiring reasonable accommodation for
employee with mental retardation of sensitivity training of co-workers and use of care by super-
visor in disciplining to avoid criticism or undue stress), with Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding request by employee with carpal tunnel syn-
drome for unpaid leave for an indefinite amount of time not reasonable), Pesterfield v. Tennes-
see Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding plaintiff's inability to handle criticism
made it impossible to perform functions of job and it was not reasonable to require employer to
provide a stress-free environment to accommodate disability), and Kuehl v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 909 F. Supp. 794, 803 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding that an individual who rejected a reasonable
accommodation was not a qualified individual with a disability).
76. Exactly how a "known" disability is defined for purposes of Title I has been the subject of
some debate. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 379, 394 (N.D. Iowa
1995) (noting that the "ADA does not require clairvoyance") (quoting Hedberg v. Indiana Bell
Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1995), which stated that the employer cannot be liable without
knowledge of the disability); Morisky v. Broward County, 80 F.3d 445, 448 (11th Cir. 1996)
(same); see also Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 129-54.
77. See Fussell v. Georgia Ports Auth., 906 F. Supp. 1561, 1569 (S.D. Ga. 1995); see also 29
C.F.R. § 1630.9 app. at 351 (noting that it is the responsibility of employee to inform employer of
need for accommodation).
78. See, e.g., Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting that the reasonable accommodation process requires good faith communication between
employer and employee, and in a case involving an employee with mental illness, communica-
tion process is even more critical); Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996)
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"qualified" if he cannot perform the job with or without an
accommodation. 79
Critics of Title I have characterized an employer's obligation to pro-
vide accommodations to qualified persons as a form of market distor-
tion leading to economic inefficiencies. 80 They claim that the duty of
reasonable accommodation creates for persons with disabilities an
employment privilege or subsidy, in that it attempts to provide cov-
ered workers the wages they would receive in a nondiscriminatory
free market.81 The duty of accommodation is cast as compromising
the ideal of free market efficiency by imposing upon employers an
affirmative duty to retain less economically efficient workers.82
There are at least three simplified hypothetical situations which il-
lustrate the distribution of possible economic implications of the re-
quired provision of accommodations for qualified job applicants or
employees covered by the law. 83 A first example involves two equally
qualified workers, that is, workers who are equally productive and of
equal economic value to the employer. Professor Donohue has set
forth such a hypothetical: "[G]iven the choice between two equally
productive workers, one requiring the expenditure of significant sums
in order to accommodate him, one requiring no such expenditures, the
(noting responsibility for fashioning accommodation shared between employer and employee);
Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding university
not liable under the ADA where the plaintiff was responsible for breakdown in the accommoda-
tion process); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (setting forth accommodation process
regulations).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(8).
80. See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 5, at 2608.
81. Donahue, supra note 5, at 2609; cf. Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th
Cir. 1996) (noting that the reasonable accommodation process does not require employer to
"bump" other employees to reassign disabled employee, nor does it require an employer to
create a new position for disabled employee); Gile v. United Airlines, 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir.
1996) (same).
82. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DuKE LJ. 1, 14 (1996) ("Reasonable accommodation is affirmative action,
in the sense that it requires an employer to take account of an individual's disabilities and to
provide special treatment to him for that reason."); Editorial, Disabling Consequences, RICH-
MOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 13, 1997, at A-10 (noting that Title I reflects "an infringement of
liberty for government to dictate whom employers must 'accommodate"').
83. Cf. Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that the term "reasonable" is intended to qualify the term "accommodation" so that
the cost of any accommodation is not disproportionate to the benefit to the employer and the
accommodation itself is efficacious, regardless of an undue hardship defense subsequently put
forth by an employer); see also Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives Versus Controls in Federal Disabil-
ity Policy, in DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 3, 14 (Carolyn
L. Weaver ed., 1991) (discussing economic impact of accommodation provision).
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profit-maximizing firm would prefer the worker who is less costly to
hire." 84
Donohue's hypothetical is not problematic for Title I economic im-
pact analysis. Title I does not require the employer to hire or retain a
qualified individual with a covered disability, regardless of the need
for accommodation, over an equally or more qualified individual with-
out a disability. There is no resultant distortion of labor market or
economic efficiencies by Title I's antidiscrimination provisions, nor is
there a requirement "to make the disabled equal. '85 Employer pre-
rogative and economic need is not disturbed and the employer is not
discouraged from searching for the most qualified worker.86 More-
over, as discussed in Part II, to the extent that many accommodation
costs for workers with disabilities are fixed or sunk, the market incen-
tive would be to retain the qualified disabled worker over an equally
or less qualified nondisabled worker requiring no accommodation. 87
A similarly simple hypothetical involves two workers whose pro-
ductivity varies. In this case, one individual with a covered disability
is more "qualified" than an individual without a disability, say by
three units of value to the employer. It requires a certain amount of
unit value to accommodate this qualified worker with a disability, say
three units of value. In this case, the net cost to the employer of em-
ploying the individual with a disability is comparable to employing the
individual without the disability and their "value" is identical.88 Title I
would require the employer to hire the legitimately more qualified
worker, regardless of disability, and would require the provision of an
84. Donohue, supra note 5, at 2608.
85. See id. at 2611; see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 164 (arguing that Title I "goes beyond the
concept of equal opportunities for equally productive workers by requiring employers to modify
job requirements or work environments to compensate for impairment-related limits on
productivity").
86. Cf. Oi, supra note 50, at 112 (arguing that Title I creates efficiency losses by forcing em-
ployers to enact a satisfying employment policy); Weaver, supra note 83, at 6 (arguing that Title I
forces employers to hire less productive workers). But see, e.g., Martin v. General Mills, Inc.,
No. 95 C 2846, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16436, at *21 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 4, 1996) (holding that Title I
does not require employers to retain less productive employees).
87. Donohue, supra note 5, at 2610 n.72.
88. There are many direct and indirect costs and benefits associated with the provision of
accommodations, including staff time spent on planning of an accommodation, enhanced pro-
ductivity of the particular workers, and even tax benefits to employers for expenses incurred in
the provision of reasonable accommodations. See Burgdorf, supra note 15, at 325-27 (describing
tax benefits and that employees may contribute to the cost of an accommodation, particularly
when aspects of the accommodation are personal in nature); SEARS II, supra note 10, at 56-61,
app. D. (listing costs and benefits of particular accommodations).
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accommodation. 89 A decision by the employer in this scenario to re-
fuse the provision of accommodation to this qualified individual with
a covered disability may constitute discrimination under Title I, as-
suming no undue hardship is associated with the provision of the
accommodation. 90
The more controversial third hypothetical also involves two workers
whose productivity varies. In this case, one individual with a covered
disability is more "qualified" than an individual without a disability by
three units of value to the employer. However, it requires thirty units
of employer value to accommodate the qualified worker with a disa-
bility, or ten times the direct cost of the accommodation. In this case,
the net cost to the employer of employing the qualified individual with
a disability is considerably more than is the cost of employing the less
qualified individual without the disability.91
In this third scenario, a decision by the employer to refuse to pro-
vide an accommodation to the qualified individual with a covered dis-
ability may or may not constitute discrimination under Title I. This
may be true, even though provision of the accommodation may be
economically inefficient to the employer, assuming actual direct and
indirect costs and benefits of the decision could be calculated. Dis-
crimination may be found if no undue hardship is associated with the
provision of an effective accommodation. Alternatively, discrimina-
tion may not be found if the element of cost or efficiency is inter-
preted to be implicit in the concept of a "reasonable"
89. The requirement to hire a worker with a disability requiring accommodation is capped,
however, by the employer's safe harbor provision of "undue hardship" examined below. See
infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
90. See Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341, 2342, and
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (noting that
Title I discrimination may be based on an employer's failure to make reasonable accommoda-
tions for a qualified job applicant or employee with a covered disability).
91. With regard to this third hypothetical, Professor Feldblum has suggested that although the
"failure to provide a reasonable accommodation is a form of discrimination [as it may be in the
hypothetical immediately above]; it is not a remedy for discrimination in the way that various
forms of affirmative action might serve as remedies." Chai R. Feldblum, The (R)evolution of
Physical Disability Anti-Discrimination Law: 1976-1996,20 MENTAL & PtrYSICAL DISABILrry L.
REP. 613, 618 (1996). In contrast to this view, in the Seventh Circuit case, Vande Zande v. State
of Wisconsin Department of Administration, Judge Posner writes: "[W]e do not think an em-
ployer has a duty to expend even modest amount of money to bring about an absolute identity in
working conditions between disabled and nondisabled workers." 44 F.3d 538, 546 (7th Cir.
1995). Judge Posner continues: "The duty of reasonable accommodation is satisfied when the
employer does what is necessary to enable the disabled worker to work in reasonable comfort."
Id.; cf. Feldblum, supra note 101, at 619 ("The 'reasonable' part of 'reasonable accommodation'
refers to whether a requested accommodation is effective in ensuring the person with a disability
can perform the job up to the standards required by the employer.").
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accommodation. 92 Under this latter view, an employer has no duty to
incur even a modest loss in value because it would not be "reason-
able" (that is, economically rational) to accommodate the disabled
employee. 93
It is this third scenario that critics of Title I use to suggest that the
accommodation provision, absent the high evidentiary burden on em-
ployers of showing undue hardship discussed below, in effect, is an
affirmative subsidy to employees with disabilities.94 Critics argue that
the accommodation provision reflects a cost to employers incurred for
employees with disabilities that is not spent on other employees with-
out disabilities, who arguably are more economically efficient but pos-
sibly less qualified or productive to perform the job in question.95
Others argue that Title I provisions reflect a judgment by society that
qualified persons with disabilities should be able to work, even when
"the value of their output does not equal the cost necessary to accom-
modate them in the work force."'96
Part II of this Article examines in greater detail findings from stud-
ies addressing the economic effect on employers of the provision of
accommodations. Additional study is required, however, of the costs
and benefits associated with accommodations in different businesses,
jobs, labor markets, and involving persons with varying disabilities. 97
Study is needed also of the frequency of occurrence of the three hypo-
thetical cases highlighted above. This analysis may show that, in prac-
tice, accommodating qualified workers with and without disabilities
92. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542-45.
93. See Feldblum, supra note 91, at 619-21 n.6 (discussing Judge Posner's reasoning in Vande
Zande decision by claiming that Posner unfortunately interpreted the word "reasonable" to in-
clude a form of "cost-benefit" analysis).
94. See Sherwin Rosen, Disability Accommodation and the Labor Market, in DISABtUTY AND
WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND OPPORTUNITIES 18, 29 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991).
95. See, e.g., Schuman, supra note 58, at 504-05 ("This is an affirmative obligation to offer
those employees with disabilities better terms and conditions than those offered other employ-
ees, at greater cost to the employer than that spent on other employees.").
96. Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected To Work?, 549
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 71, 80-81 (1997) (arguing that Title I provisions force
taxpayers to bear part of the cost of accommodations, either through higher costs or tax credits).
97. Many qualified individuals with perceived disabilities or with a record of impairment cov-
ered under the second and third prong of the definition of disability may not need an accommo-
dation, even though they are denied employment opportunity on the basis that their employer
believes an accommodation may be required in the future. In this case, the Title I antidis-
crimination provisions are implicated and should impose no economic inefficiencies on employ-
ers. See Weaver, supra note 83, at 14 (discussing the probable impact of the legislation and the
courts having the capacity to alter the costs of legislation by deciding what is reasonable and
what is covered). Empirical study is needed on employers' attitudes about the need for accom-




leads to efficient and cost-effective workplace operation.98 In the ab-
sence of accurate and reliable measures of worker "value," however,
economic efficiency arguments, pro and con, of accommodation im-
plementation may need to be reevaluated.
E. Undue Hardship
A final economic implication involves Title I's economic effect on
employers of different sizes and in different labor markets, particu-
larly with regard to the provision of reasonable accommodations. Ti-
tle I does not require an accommodation if it would impose an "undue
hardship" on the employer. An undue hardship requires significant
difficulty or expense in relation to the accommodation or the re-
sources of the company.99 A common critique is that accommoda-
tions for qualified individuals create hardships that are costly and
burdensome for employers. Attitudes about the cost-effectiveness of
accommodations by employers, however, often have more to do with
unfounded beliefs than with the actual qualifications of persons with
disabilities or their ability to add to employers' economic value.100
Title I identifies a number of economically based factors to be con-
sidered in determining undue hardship, including the nature and net
cost of the accommodation, the financial resources of the business, the
number of persons employed at the business, the impact of the accom-
modation on the operation of the business, the geographic separate-
ness of the business facilities affected, and the composition and
98. See infra notes 130-43 and accompanying text (noting atypical cases whose frequency in
practice may be too small to rely upon for policy making purposes, and as in critiques by econo-
mists that Title I is inefficient and made without reliance on empirical study).
99. Decisions about undue hardship are made on a case-by-case basis. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)
(1994); see also Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (discuss-
ing employer's cost-benefit analysis); Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 2182-84 (8th Cir. 1985)
(providing physician and laboratory facilities in remote location for monitoring appropriate
medication level of employee with bipolar condition constituted undue hardship); Hill v. Florida
Dept. of Pub. Health, 2 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 177, 182-83 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that
an employer did not have to eliminate public-contact function of position to accommodate em-
ployee with depressive disorder because accommodation would impose undue hardship by re-
quiring co-worker to perform employee's job).
100. Cf. Philip S. Lewis, Attitudes and Behavior of Employers Toward Persons with Disabili-
ties in a Post-ADA Labor Market (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Union Institute),
abstracted in 55 DISSERTATIONs AasTRAcr INT'L No. 10, at 4593 (1994) (finding minimal differ-
ence in attitudes and behavior of employers of different sizes or type of business, but substantial
differences regarding provision of accommodations with larger firms more likely to provide ac-
commodations); Lisa M. Ehrhart, A National Study of Employer Attitudes Toward Persons with
Disabilities (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University), ab-
stracted in 55 DISSERTATIONS AnsrRAcrs INT'L No. 7, at 1082 (1994) (finding no difference
between assessed attitudes toward person with disabilities and size of business).
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functions of the work force of the business. 101 This list of economic
impact factors is meant to ensure that the business' size, type, sales,
and relevant labor markets are not affected by accommodations that
pose a financial hardship to the operation of the business or that fun-
damentally alter the nature of the business. 0 2 Although the em-
ployer's undue hardship defense is assessed on a case-by-case basis,
relevant economic, incremental, and opportunity costs claimed (for
example, measured in terms of lost profits or market value) may vary
by industry and will need to be assessed. 0 3
The next Part examines empirical study on the economics of the
provision of workplace accommodations. Regardless of such analysis,
proponents of Title I suggest that cost-benefit analysis is a secondary
justification to the antidiscrimination purposes of the law. Yet, if it is
the case that on average, the benefits and value to employers of effec-
tive accommodations implemented exceed the costs, then the accom-
modation provision is not only consistent with the antidiscrimination
purposes of the law, but also reflects economically efficient and ra-
tional workplace practices that have applications to qualified persons
with and without disabilities.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF WORKPLACE ACCOMMODATIONS
It is apparent that answers to questions related to Title I implemen-
tation and interpretation must be guided increasingly by systematic
empirical study.' o4 Professor Collignon has argued that it is crucial to
establish baseline data and models of empirical study to help foster an
informed dialogue about Title I implementation and effectiveness.10 5
One area that has received the most study, given the ability to quan-
tify associated costs and benefits, has been the analysis of the eco-
101. 42 U.S.C. §12111(10)(B).
102. See Feldblum, supra note 91, at 619 (discussing legislative history of undue hardship pro-
vision and that Congress rejected a bright-line amendment to Title I that would have tied the
determination of undue hardship to a percentage of an employee's salary).
103. See Ralph R. Frasca & Bernard J. Winger, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990:
New Opportunities for Forensic Economists, 6 J. FORENSIC ECON. 81, 86-90 (1993) (providing
examples of incremental and net costs associated with provision of accommodations for different
businesses).
104. Cf. GAO REPORT, supra note 36, at 3-4, 22 (finding absence of data collection efforts by
agencies regarding ADA implementation).
105. Frederick C. Collignon, Is the ADA Successful? Indicators for Tracking Gains, 549 AN-
NALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 129, 130-32 (1997) (discussing various indicators of Title I
implementation, including unemployment, poverty, and legal compliance rates); see also Corinne
Kirchner, Looking Under the Street Lamp: Inappropriate Uses of Measures Because They Are
There, 7 J. DISABILITY POL. STUD. 77, 82-86 (1996) (critiquing prior researchers overreliance on
labor force participation measures as indicator of effective Title I implementation).
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nomic implications to employers of workplace accommodations under
Title 1.106 This Part examines the ongoing debate regarding the eco-
nomics of accommodations in light of emerging study of the area.107
As mentioned above, one common criticism is that the costs of ac-
commodations outweigh the benefits provided to employers and per-
sons with disabilities. 1°8 Critics contend that the required provision of
reasonable accommodations places financial burdens and administra-
tive costs on the operation of businesses. 10 9 Some argue that the costs
of accommodations are especially high for large employers, who may
be held accountable for extensive modifications due to their greater
financial resources. 110
A common thread in these critiques is that they are made without
reliance on data. In the absence of empirical information, it is no sur-
prise that the attitudes and behavior of many employers reflect the
view that the costs of accommodations outweigh the benefits."' It is
106. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 94, at 22 (finding previous research has been devoted to the
connection between labor supply and disability); Weaver, supra note 83, at 5 (noting that "[t]he
central flaw of the ADA ... is in the imposition on employers of a duty to 'accommodate' the
mental or physical limitations of the disabled worker or applicant without weighing the expected
benefits of such accommodation"); see also Employing People with Disabilities Makes Good
Business Sense, REGION V NEWS, (Great Lakes Disability & Bus. Tech. Assistance Ctr.), Fall
1995, at 4 [hereinafter GREAT LAKES] (finding that 28% of approximately 73,000 Title I charges
through September 30, 1996, allege failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and that an-
other 52% involve discharge).
107. The economic relationship among required public accommodations under Title III of the
ADA (for example, accessible public transportation), Title I workplace accommodations, and
employment opportunity for qualified persons with disabilities requires detailed analysis beyond
the scope of this Article. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 82, at 41 n.81 (noting the cost
efficiencies theory regarding Titles I, II, and III of the ADA).
108. See, e.g., James Bovard, Disability Intentions Astray, WASH. TIMES, May 20, 1996, at A16
(concluding that the ADA is costly and economically inefficient); Richard A. Epstein, The Legal
Regulation of Genetic Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 23
(1994) (discussing when the absolute right to refuse employment or insurance is denied, without
exception, the employer or insurer is forced into a losing economic position); Christopher J.
Willis, Comment, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Disabling the Disabled, 25 CUMB.
L. REV. 715, 725-30 (1995) (finding that the costs which the ADA will likely impose on employ-
ers will ultimately be borne by consumers which will decrease the net wealth of American
society).
109. See generally IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (Lawrence 0.
Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993) (reviewing Title I provisions). Title I also does not require
that employers alter their insurance benefit plans to employees working part-time as an accom-
modation to their disability. See Tenbrink v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 920 F. Supp. 1156, 1162-
64 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that under Title I, an employer may provide health benefits only to
full-time workers, even if this requirement results in reduction in benefits for workers with disa-
bilities who are accommodated with part-time schedules).
110. Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers and
Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 229, 251-52 (1990); Willis, supra note 108, at 726-27.
111. See Collignon, supra note 6, at 231-38 (arguing that economists' negative theorizing
about the costly effects of accommodation often do not consider the actual experiences of busi-
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helpful to reiterate that Title I does not require employers to hire indi-
viduals with disabilities who are not qualified or to hire qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities over equally or more qualified individuals
without disabilities.1 12 More than three quarters of all Title I charges
filed with the EEOC have been dismissed 13 because, among other
reasons, the plaintiff alleging discrimination failed to show that he was
qualified for the position.' 14
Many individuals with disabilities currently in the work force have
appropriate job skills, that is, they are "qualified" for purposes of the
law and have their accommodation needs met in reasonable and effec-
tive ways.11 5 Findings from the 1989 National Health Interview Sur-
vey show that roughly 60 percent of working age adults with
disabilities rate their health as good to excellent." 6 Nevertheless,
nesses); Baldwin, supra note 28, at 49 (suggesting that the most frequent employer concerns
about Title I include costs of accommodations).
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m), (n) (1991); SEARS 1, supra note 10, at 30-40; SEARS II, supra note
10, at 42; see also Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 334 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that the ADA
ensures that qualified individuals be treated in "a manner consistent with basic human dignity,
rather than a manner which shunts them aside, hides, and ignores them"). Nevertheless, some
scholars cast Title l's reasonable accommodation provision as "contrary to our understanding of
equal treatment developed under other anti-discrimination statutes." Deborah A. Calloway,
Dealing with Diversity: Changing Theories of Discrimination, 10 ST. JOHN'S J. LEG. COMMENT.
481,492 (1995) (interpreting Title I to judge individuals on the basis of their group status and not
on their individual merits).
113. Lisa J. Stansky, Opening Doors: Five Years After Its Passage, the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act Has Not Fulfilled the Greatest Fears of Its Critics-or the Greatest Hopes of Its Support-
ers, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1996, at 66 (1996) (noting that 40% of claims were dismissed for having "no
reasonable cause" and another 43% were closed for adminstrative reasons).
114. GREAT LAKES, supra note 106, at 5 (finding as of September 30, 1996, 46% of Title I
charges filed with the EEOC were dismissed for having no reasonable cause, another 40% were
closed for administrative reasons, including claims that they were withdrawn or were closed be-
cause the complaining parties failed to cooperate with the agency); see also Ellison v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that woman treated for breast cancer
with daily radiation therapy did not have a disability under the ADA).
115. A study by the National Academy of Social Insurance found that many qualified persons
with disabilities prefer to work and only use disability benefits as a last resort. 2 SUCCESSFUL
JOB ACCOMMODATIONS STRATEGIES (June 1996); see also Executive Summary of "Balancing
Security and Opportunity: The Challenge of Disability Income Policy", 59 SOCIAL SECURITY
BULLETIN 79, 79 (Spring 1996) (showing about half of the 34 million working-age adults who
experience mental illness over the course of a year are employed; about one-third of the 16.8
million persons with work disabilities are in the labor force, either working or looking for work);
DISABILITY WATCH, supra note 19, at 16 (citing DISABLED AMERICANS' SELF-PERCEPTIONS:
BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM (Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., ed.,
1986)) (showing that 79% of persons with disabilities below the age of 65 who do not work
report that they want to work).
116. See Kaye, supra note 19, at 12 (noting that in many cases, disability is the result of a past
health problem or injury that does not presently require medical attention). For an extensive
analysis of factors related to the self-reported health status of persons with disabilities, see
Mitchell P. LaPlante, DISABILITY, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, AND UTILIZATION OF
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some courts presume that most impairments by definition impact an
individual's ability to perform up to the standards of the workplace
and increase the relative costs to employers of hiring the individual. 117
In contrast to this view, surveys show that executives have favorable
attitudes toward the employment and accommodation of qualified
employees with disabilities. A 1995 Harris Poll of business executives
found that 79 percent of those surveyed believe that the employment
of qualified people with disabilities is a boost to the economy, while
only 2 percent believe it poses a "threat to take jobs" from people
without disabilities." 8
The developing empirical evidence also does not reflect the view
that Title I's accommodation provision is a preferential treatment ini-
tiative that forces employers to ignore employee qualifications and
economic efficiency. 119 To the contrary, studies of accommodations
suggest that companies that are effectively implementing the law
demonstrate the ability or "corporate culture" to look beyond mini-
mal compliance of the law in ways that enhance economic value. The
low direct costs of accommodations for employees with disabilities has
been shown to produce substantial economic benefits to companies, in
terms of increased work productivity, injury prevention, reduced
workers' compensation costs, and workplace effectiveness and
efficiency.' 20
ACUTE HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES (Disability Statistics Report No. 4: U.S.
Dept. Ed., Nat'l Institute Disability Research 1993).
117. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995)
(claiming that if the employers have potentially unlimited financial obligations to 43 million
disabled people, there will be an indirect tax greater than the national debt).
118. SEARS 1I, supra note 10, at 43 (citing 1995 SURVEY OF CORPORATE EXECUTIVES OF THE
ADA (Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc. ed., 1995) [hereinafter Louis HARRIS SURVEY]); PRESI-
DENT'S COMMITEE ON PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, ABILITY FOR HIRE 1 (Washington, D.C.,
1996) (citing MASON-DIXON POLL, Florida Chamber of Commerce Foundation's Disability
Awareness Project (Jan. 1995) (on file with the DePaul Law Review)) (noting that 72% of busi-
nesses that hired persons with disabilities reported that the employment of people with disabili-
ties had a favorable effect on their business and 87% said they would encourage other employers
to hire persons with disabilities); OSHA Rules 'By Far' Most Burdensome for Employer Cham-
ber Survey Finds, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 124 A17, A18 (June 27, 1996) (rating the relative
burden of requirements issued under various labor and employment laws on a scale of 1 (least)
to 10 (most burdensome), small employers rated ADA requirements at 4.8 compared to a 6.2 for
OSHA, and a 4.4 for the Fair Labor Standards Act).
119. See, e.g., SEARS II, supra note 10, at 42 (finding that the costs of accommodating qualified
workers are relatively low and the economic and productivity benefits are relatively high).
120. See SEARS II, supra note 10, at 42-43; see also Francine S. Hall & Elizabeth L. Hall, The
ADA: Going Beyond the Law, 8 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVES 17, 17-26 (1994) (noting that one of
the indirect benefits of following the ADA occurs when a corporation acknowledges reality and
supports people with special needs, thereby gaining a strategic and competitive advantage).
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In a series of studies conducted at Sears, Roebuck and Co. from
1978 to 1996,121 a time period before and after Title I's July 26, 1992
effective date, nearly all of the 500 accommodations sampled required
little or no cost.122 During the years 1993 to 1996, the average direct
cost for accommodations was $45, and from 1978 to 1992, the average
direct cost was $121.123 The Sears studies also show that the direct
costs of accommodating employees with hidden disabilities (for exam-
ple, emotional and neurological impairments comprising roughly 15
percent of the cases studied) are even lower than the overall average
of $45.124
Other studies show that accommodations for employees with disa-
bilities lead to direct and indirect benefits and cost-effective applica-
tions that increase the productivity of employees without disabilities.
Studies by the Job Accommodation Network ("JAN") demonstrate
the benefits to employers of accommodations for qualified employees.
More than two-thirds of effective accommodations implemented as a
result of a JAN consultation cost less than $500.125 In addition, almost
two-thirds of the accommodations studied result in savings to the
company in excess of $5,000.126 The savings associated with accom-
modations include lower job training costs and insurance claims, in-
creased worker productivity, and reduced rehabilitation costs after
injury on the job.' 27 JAN reports that for every dollar invested in an
effective accommodation, companies sampled realized an average of
$50 in benefits.' 28 Likewise, the results of a 1995 Harris Poll of more
than 400 executives show that more than three-quarters of those sur-
veyed report minimal increases in costs associated with the provision
of accommodations (for example, median direct cost for accommoda-
tions was $233 per covered employee), and from 1986 to 1995, the
121. See, e.g., SEARS I, supra note 10, at 16 (stating that "Sears employs among its 300,000
person work force an estimated 20,000 persons with physical or mental disabilities").
122. Id. at 17 (noting "72% required no cost, 17% cost less than $100, 10% cost less than $500,
and only 1% cost more than $500, but not more than $1,000"). Effective accommodations in-
clude assistive technology, physical access, changed schedules, assistance by others, and changed
job duties. See Mary C. Daly & John Bound, Worker Adaptation and Employer Accommodation
Following the Onset of a Health Impairment, 51 J. GERONTOLOGY S53 (1996).
123. SEARS II, supra note 10, at 18.
124. Id. at 20 (finding that from 1993 to 1996, the average cost for behavioral impairments was
$0 and the average cost for neurological impairments was $13).
125. Id. at 26 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMrITEE ON EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILI-
ns, JOB ACCOMMODATION NETWORK (JAN) REPORTS (Oct.-Dec. 1994) (Washington, D.C.,
1994)).
126. Id. (providing information on accommodations for employees with disabilities).
127. Id.
128. Id.; see also infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text (discussing a study of Canadian
work force showing return on accommodation investment).
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proportion of companies providing accommodations rose from 51 per-
cent to 81 percent. 129
Several general implications may be drawn from the existing find-
ings. First, the degree to which many companies comply with the ac-
commodation provisions of Title I appears to have more to do with
their corporate cultures, attitudes, and business strategies than with
the actual demands of the law. For many companies with a culture of
work force diversity and inclusion, implementation has resulted in ec-
onomically effective business strategies that transcend minimal com-
pliance with the law and produce economic value.130 In this regard,
studies of accommodation costs at Sears showed that the indirect cost
of not retaining qualified workers is high, with the average administra-
tive cost per employee replacement of $1,800 to $2,40013'-roughly
forty times the average of the direct costs of workplace
accommodations.
Second, in terms of relative cost, although the direct costs of the
accommodations for any particular disability tend to be low, 3 2 many
companies regularly make informal and undocumented accommoda-
tions that require minor and cost-free workplace adjustments that are
implemented directly by an employee and his supervisor. 33 The trend
toward the provision of accommodation in the workplace may suggest
129. SEARS II, supra note 10, at 24 (citing Louis HARRIS SURVEY, supra note 128).
130. See id. (finding neither cost alone nor severity of disability determined Sears strategy
toward the provision of accommodations); Collignon, supra note 6, at 208 (stating "firms saw
accommodation as good business practice"); PETER D. BLANCK & CRAIG L. LAMAY, TRAN-
SCENDING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RESEARCH, POLICY, AND EMPLOYMENT
STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with author) (dis-
cussing when employers hire, work with, and accommodate qualified employees with disabilities,
they enhance their customer bases, employee morale, and business goals); see also Lauren B.
Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights
Laws, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINATION AND PUBLIC
POLICY 247, 247-48 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994) (finding that organizations are motivated by legal
process to construct law in ways consistent with societal norms and culture); David A. Thomas &
Robin J. Ely, Making Differences Matter: A New Paradigm for Managing Diversity, HARV. Bus.
REV., Sept./Oct., 1996, at 79-80 (explaining that fundamental changes in an organization's hierar-
chy adopting a diverse workplace increases profitability, creativity, and flexibility of the
workplace).
131. SEARS II, supra note 10, at 42.
132. Although many of the accommodations studied at Sears involve simple and common
sense strategies, these same accommodation requests in other settings have been the subject of
litigation. See, e.g., Kuehl v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 794, 798 (D. Colo. 1995) (dis-
cussing a Title I claim involving a requested accommodation of periodic sitting on stool while on
work duty).
133. SEARS II, supra note 10, at 19-24; SEARS I, supra note 10, at 12 (noting that since 1972,
fewer than 10% of Sears employees who were self-identified as disabled through the company's
Selective Placement Program required any kind of accommodation at the time of self-identifica-
tion); cf. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 82, at 23 (arguing, without support of data, that an
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that employers are realizing positive economic returns on the accom-
modation investment, for instance, by enabling qualified workers with
covered disabilities to return to or stay in the work force and by re-
ducing worker absenteeism. 134
Professor Rosen points out, however, that where the benefits of ac-
commodations exceed the costs "there is no inherent reason to expect
that labor markets free of government intervention will fail to provide
job accommodations in normal job situations.' 1 35 Yet, as discussed
above, absent a truly competitive labor market, attitudinal discrimina-
tion against qualified individuals with disabilities alone may necessi-
tate the required provision of accommodations under Title I, at least
for a large segment of the labor force affected by this market fail-
ure.136 This is true given that the value of a worker with a disability
often is contingent upon his output and his employers' and others'
attitudes about the worker.137 Over time,138 with the lessening of
prejudicial attitudes resulting from effective Title I implementation,
accommodation in any form requires an employer to incur cost, and sometimes the "subsidy
turns out to be a good investment" in terms of worker productivity or in attracting customers).
134. See Collignon, supra note 6, at 209 (stating that businesses are more likely to provide
lower cost accommodations, particularly when a current employee becomes disabled); Weaver,
supra note 83, at 9, 11-12 (noting that Title I provides economic incentives to businesses to hire
individuals requiring accommodations that have indirect benefits to the firm or to customers);
Deborah S. Cowans, Employers Bear Millions in Elder Caregiving Costs, Bus. INS., June 24,
1995, at 2 (discussing a study of a large manufacturer with about 87,000 employees who estimates
$5.5 million in lost productivity and time associated with employees providing personal care for
elderly relatives, and accommodations such as flexible work schedules mitigate these costs);
Heidi Berven & Peter D. Blanck, Economic Returns on the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Empirical Study of Disability-Related Patents from 1970 to
1997 (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with author) (providing an analysis of positive eco-
nomic projections associated with disability-related patents filed).
135. Rosen, supra note 94, at 26.
136. See Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (finding bad faith
in reasonable accommodation implementation process often reflective of irrational attitudinal
bias by employer). Thus, independent of the effects of the civil rights guaranteed by the law, the
crux of the normative question is whether Title I is economically rational.
137. See Donohue, supra note 5, at 2585 (discussing concept of "contingent equality"). Re-
search is needed also on the extent to which contingent worker value varies across industries or
with different labor markets. Id.
138. Long-term empirical assessment of Title I is necessary as has been discussed and con-
ducted, for instance, on the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & James
Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Eco-
nomic Status of Blacks, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINA-
TION AND PUBLIC POLICY 183 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994) (examining the available evidence on the
causes of African-American economic advances to access the contribution of federal policy);
David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Law Enforcement, in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: LABOR MARKET DISCRIMINA-
TION AND PUBLIC POLICY 39 (Paul Burstein ed., 1994) (reviewing the accomplishments and
shortcomings of federal opportunity law over the last 25 years).
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and with increased knowledge from empirical study, employers who
were formerly "economic discriminators" against qualified persons
with disabilities may be less willing or less able to incur lost profits to
satisfy their discriminatory tastes or preferences. 139
Third, accommodations involving universally designed and ad-
vanced technology have been shown to enable groups of employees
with and without disabilities to perform jobs productively, cost-effec-
tively, and safely.1 40 The studies at Sears suggest that the direct costs
associated with many technologically based accommodations (for ex-
ample, computer voice synthesizers) enabled qualified employees with
disabilities to perform essential job functions and that these strategies
create an economic "ripple effect" throughout the company, as related
applications are developed subsequently that increased the productiv-
ity of Sears employees without disabilities. 141 These findings suggest
that the direct costs attributed to universally designed accommoda-
tions may be lower than predicted, particularly when their fixed or
sunk costs are amortized over time.' 42 In addition, the Sears findings
support those of organizational researchers showing that many tradi-
tional blue-collar jobs increasingly require workers to use or monitor
computers that control equipment performing work tasks and that
workers with disabilities may increasingly and efficiently perform such
essential job functions. 143
139. See Weaver, supra note 83, at 6 (noting that "[l]ost profits are the price an 'economic
discriminator' pays to indulge his preferences"). Study is needed of the impact of the emerging
consumer market comprised of people with disabilities and the affect that this market will have
on employers' preferences and economic ability to hire and retain qualified workers with disabil-
ities. See SEARS I, supra note 10, at 8-9.
140. See SEARS II, supra note 10, at 35-36; SEARS I, supra note 10, at 16-17, 26-29; S.F. Wilson
et al., A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON CONSUMER AND Ex-PATIENT ROLES IN SuP-
PORTED HOUSING SERVICES (Burlington, Vt.: The Center for Community Change Through
Housing and Support 1991) (concluding that the effect of hiring people with psychiatric disabili-
ties was to improve the level of individual attention and accommodation to all employees, thus
creating a more positive working environment); see also Peter D. Blanck, Communications Tech-
nology for Everyone: Implications for the Classroom and Beyond, Annenberg Washington Pro-
gram Report (1994); Deborah Kaplan et al., Telecommunications for Persons with Disabilities:
Laying the Foundation, WORLD INST. ON DISABILITY REP. (Oakland, California, 1992).
141. See SEARS I, supra note 10, at 16-17.
142. See Collignon, supra note 6, at 205-06 (noting that universally designed accommodations
may reflect more efficient way to undertake production and improve productivity of co-work-
ers); Donohue, supra note 5, at 2612 n.72 (suggesting that if accommodation costs for workers
with disabilities are sunk, then the market incentive would be to retain the qualified disabled
worker over an equally or less qualified nondisabled worker requiring no accommodation);
Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 82, at 23 (same).
143. SEARS II, supra note 10, at 22; see SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART
MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER (1988); Edward H. Yelin, The Employment of
People With and Without Disabilities in an Age of Insecurity, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCL 117, 128 (1997).
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Future examination is needed of the type, effectiveness, and cost of
accommodations at large and small organizations, using standardized
means for gathering and analyzing information. 144 Study must be con-
ducted on the fears and stigmas associated with disclosure of actual
and hidden disabilities and the resulting employment consequences,
for instance, the extent to which qualified job applicants and employ-
ees with hidden disabilities forgo the benefits of accommodations due
to fear of disclosure, thereby potentially depriving the labor market
and employers of a source of value. 145
Close examination is needed of direct and indirect costs and bene-
fits of Title I implementation and who bears the costs and receives the
benefits associated with workplace accommodations for qualified per-
sons with covered disabilities. 146 A recent empirical study based on
over 1,000 observations in the Canadian work force examined the ex-
tent to which the costs of workplace accommodations are shifted by
employers to injured workers through wage adjustments upon the in-
jured worker's return to work after a workplace injury.147 The re-
searchers found that injured workers did not incur the cost of
workplace accommodations when they returned to their time-of-acci-
dent employer. Presumably, these workers were "qualified" to re-
sume their essential or comparable job duties in ways that added
economic value to the employer. 148 Injured workers who returned to
the work force but to a different employer did "pay" for a portion of
workplace accommodations by accepting substantially lower wages.' 49
Additional study is required of the extent to which accommodations
for workplace injury enable qualified workers with covered disabilities
to stay or return to work at their time-of-accident employer or to a
144. See Mary T. Giliberti, Implementation of the Reasonable Accommodation Provisions of
the ADA by the EEOC and the Courts, 6 J. CAL. ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL 19, 19-20
(1995); Diane Sands, Reasonable Accommodation or Improbable Emancipation?, 6 J. CAL AL-
LIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL 19, 21-22 (1995).
145. See, e.g., Collignon, supra note 6, at 231 (noting a need for studies on those accommoda-
tions requested by job applicants who subsequently are not hired).
146. See Morley Gunderson & Douglas Hyatt, Do Injured Workers Pay for Reasonable Ac-
commodation?, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 92, 101 (1996) (indicating that "injured workers did
not pay for workplace accomadations or reduced physical demands if they returned to their
time-of-accident employer," but that "injured workers who.., took jobs with an employer other
than the time-of-accident employer did pay at least a portion of the cost of the accomodations by
accepting lower wages in exchange for workplace modifications").
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note oz, at 23 (suggesting, without support of
data, that persons with disabilities face higher costs of searching for a job than do persons with-
out disabilities and that if costs to employer of accommodation by job transfer are greater than
costs of worker job search, then worker should bear that cost).
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different employer, who bears the associated costs, and how the costs
vary with job type and other factors such as insurance coverage rates.
Some researchers have suggested that, over time, the provision of Ti-
tle I accommodations may increase or at least help maintain employ-
ment rates by enabling newly disabled workers to retain
employment. 150 Other studies show that accommodations for work-
ers' health conditions extend their work life by an average of five
years.151
Indirect costs associated with Title I implementation include related
expenses for administrative, compliance, or legal actions. 152 The Sears
study examined all 138 Title I charges filed with the EEOC against
Sears from 1990 to mid-1995. 53 The findings showed that almost all
of the EEOC charges (98 percent) were resolved without resort to
trial litigation, and many through informal dispute processes that ena-
bled qualified employees with disabilities to return to productive
work. 154 Consistent with the Sears findings, a 1997 study of nation-
wide trends in Title I charges filed with the EEOC showed that 94
percent of beneficial outcomes were obtained by the charging parties
before full EEOC investigations and formal litigation were
initiated. 55
150. See Nancy R. Mudrick, Employment Discrimination Laws for Disability: Utilization and
Outcome, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 53, 68-70 (1997) (citing studies showing that
a majority of persons injured in the workplace maintain their labor force attachment).
151. Burkhauser, supra note 96, at 80 (showing that the range of work life extension from
accommodations was found to be from 2.6 to 7.5 years, but authors suggest that range is affected
by severity of condition and expected prognosis rates).
152. Peter D. Blanck, Transcending Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Case
Report on Sears, Roebuck and Co., 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 278, 283-84
(1996) (discussing the direct and indirect costs associated with Title I implementation); see also
Rosen, supra note 94, at 22-27 (same). Some studies also suggest that the administrative, compli-
ance, and legal costs associated with Title I implementation are not as great as some predicted.
See SEARS II, supra note 10, at 43. Research is needed, however, on employers' costs associated
with the threat of Title I sanctions or litigation, for instance, the legal costs incurred when an
employee with a disability is terminated even for valid reasons. Research is needed on the costs
(for example, inefficiencies and uncertainty) or benefits (for example, limited scope of inquiries)
related to the case-by-case analytical approach required by Title I. Id. at 12-15 (discussing
EEOC's 1995 modifications to Title I charge processing and prioritization process, designed to
reduce charge backlog). Other costs and benefits related to potential Title I charges and capable
of study relate to the planning of an accommodation or the impact of an accommodation on
training and safe workplace practices for fellow employees without disabilities.
153. SEARS II, supra note 10, at 33-34.
154. Id. at 35-37 (finding in addition, of the cases studied, the average settlement cost to Sears,
exclusive of attorney fees, was $6,193); see also Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 82, at 23 (argu-
ing, without support of data, that there is an advantage of settlement over litigation in Title I
context for persons with disabilities compared to other protected groups, due to factors such as
hypothesized limitations in job search ability of persons with disabilities).
155. See Kathryn Moss et al., Assessing Employment Discrimination Charges Filed Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, J. DISABILITY POL'Y STUD. (forthcoming 1997) (suggesting that
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Additional analysis is needed on a national scale of the patterns and
magnitude of the costs and benefits associated with Title I implemen-
tation, compliance, and related litigation. 156 Professors Karlan and
Rutherglen have suggested a variety of factors involving Title I imple-
mentation and compliance that may help guide future study.157 They
hypothesize that, given the low cost of many accommodations and
high costs attendant to litigation, employers and applicants or employ-
ees with disabilities create a "bargaining range" within which they
negotiate the costs and benefits associated with minimum accommo-
dation the employee or applicant may accept and the costs and bene-
fits associated with the maximum accommodation the employer may
undertake. 5 8 Analysis of the relative magnitude of direct and indirect
costs and benefits associated with the accommodation process for dif-
ferent employers and for workers with and without disabilities in simi-
lar jobs may enable a more accurate assessment over time of the
economic impact of Title J. 159 Moreover, broadly defined, indirect
costs and benefits may include the impact of effective accommoda-
tions on employee morale, perceptions of the business and its reputa-
the presence of Title I motivates parties to resolve disputes informally without resort to costly
trial litigation and finding that variation in a charging party's likelihood of receiving a benefit
based on the party's type of disability, race, and gender).
156. See, e.g., DISABILITY WATCH, supra note 19, at 22 (citing N.O.D./HARRiS SURVEY OF
AMERICANS wrrH DISABILIES (Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., ed., 1995)) (finding from survey of
employers that 66% report that litigation has not increased as a result of the ADA, 82% report
that the ADA is worth the cost of implementation, 27% report that it costs more to employ a
person with a disability than a person without a disability); ADA Changes Decline But Monetary
Awards Increase, WASINGTON FAX (President's Comm. on Employment of People with Disa-
bilities, Washington, D.C.), Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 1 (on file with the DePaul Law Review) (citing
EEOC records showing that Title I charge filings decreased by 10% during 1996 year as com-
pared to 1995).
157. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 82, at 30.
158. Id. at 30-31; see also Peter D. Blanck, On Integrating Persons with Mental Retardation:
The ADA and ADR, 22 N.M. L, REV. 259, 263-64, 270-71 (1992) (discussing the benefits of
alternative dispute resolution practices in cases involving persons with disabilities, including the
development of a "settlement framework" and "dynamic" working relationships among the
parties).
159. See, e.g., Calloway, supra note 112, at 494 (suggesting that in absence of study, reasonable
accommodation requirement may foster backlash against Title I); Collignon, supra note 6, at 208
(discussing the economic benefits of accommodation and reviewing study of accommodation
costs and benefits under Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Donohue, supra note 37, at 1603 (sug-
gesting need to study relative magnitude of costs to benefits in antidiscrimination employment
laws); Oi, supra note 50, at 39 (suggesting the need for study comparing the average productivity
and the costs and benefits of accommodations for a random sample of persons with and without
disabilities, in and out of the work force). Future studies may examine the economic relation-
ship among Title I implementation, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 implementation, and
laws such as workers' compensation laws, health insurance laws, the Family Medical Leave Act,
and OSHA regulations, given that employment discrimination lawsuits increasingly allege multi-
ple claims of discrimination under various laws. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 1.
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tion by customers and the community, or relationship to effective
implementation of other laws such as the Family Medical Leave Act
or workers' compensation laws.160
III. CONCLUSION
Systematic evaluation of the economic implications associated with
the emerging and existing work force of qualified persons with disabil-
ities is needed for several reasons. First, study of the labor force of
qualified persons with disabilities may aid in long-term Title I imple-
mentation, as well as interpretation of related initiatives such as wel-
fare, health care, and health insurance reform.161 The Health
Insurance Reform Act of 1996, for instance, is written to ensure access
to portable health insurance for employees with chronic illness or dis-
abilities who lose or change their jobs.162 Under the law, group health
plan premium charges may not be based solely on disability status or
the severity of an individual's chronic illness. 163 The combined eco-
nomic impact of the Health Insurance Reform Act and Title I on re-
ducing employment discrimination facing qualified persons with
covered disabilities is a promising area for study.164
Second, study limited to the analysis of litigation and the EEOC
charges associated with Title I implementation, while necessary, tends
to focus discussion on the "failures" of the system, as opposed to eco-
nomically efficient strategies designed to enhance a productive work
force and identify potential disputes before they arise.165 Independent
160. See Peter D. Blanck, Communicating the Americans with Disabilities Act, Transcending
Compliance: 1997 Report on Direct and Indirect Costs and Benefits of Workplace Accommoda-
tions at Sears, Roebuck & Co. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with author).
161. Johnson, supra note 8, at 160-62 (arguing that the ADA must be evaluated in context of
other social welfare programs, for instance, with regard to economic incentives to work or return
to work).
162. Health Insurance Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
163. Id. (discussing how this antidiscrimination provision does not apply to individual insur-
ance plans); cf. EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 195, at D-89 (7th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting the view that ADA Title I requires parity among physical and mental health benefits
provided by employers). A similar study is required of the impact of the Mental Health Parity
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, Title VII, 110 Stat. 2944, on employment opportunity for
qualified persons with mental disabilities.
164. For instance, if a particular job-related medical intervention, such as gene therapy for
chemical sensitivity to workplace air contaminants, would enable a qualified worker with a disa-
bility to perform his job (that is, work in the particular workplace), could this be considered a
form of reasonable accommodation either required by Title I, assuming no undue hardship, and
to what extent could the procedure then be covered by the employee's health insurance group
plan? Discussions with Robert Olick aided in the development of this hypothetical.
165. See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 82, at 30-31 (arguing that reported Title I cases
present a skewed picture of accommodation costs and benefits, for instance, when they involve
situations where accommodation costs are high and job availability is limited).
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of study of the enforcement of the civil rights guaranteed by Title I,
the long-term promise of the law to raise awareness of the promise of
equal employment opportunity for qualified persons requires the col-
lection of information on attitudes, behavior, and the related eco-
nomic implications of the law.166
Third, some evidence suggests that Title I implementation has coin-
cided with larger numbers of qualified persons with severe disabilities
entering the labor force. In 1996, the U.S. Census Bureau released
data showing that the employment-to-population ratio for persons
with severe disabilities has increased from roughly 23 percent in 1991
to 26 percent in 1994, reflecting an increase of approximately 800,000
people with severe disabilities in the work force.167 Examination is
required of the economic impact of Title I on workplace accommoda-
tion costs and benefits against this backdrop of increased labor force
participation of qualified workers with disabilities, particularly in the
context of the recent reforms to welfare policy.1 68
Despite the encouraging trends, estimates of unemployment levels
for persons with disabilities range as high as 50 percent. 169 Some stud-
166. See, e.g., Blanck & Marti, supra note 1.
167. Id. (describing a longitudinal study from 1990 to 1995 tracking employment trends for
several thousand persons with mental retardation finding that during this initial Title I imple-
mentation time period, 43% of the participants attained integrated employment and relative
unemployment levels decreased from 39% to 12% and that in 1995 participants' job skills re-
lated to their earned income levels); "Six Years After Signing of Law, ADA Has Been Cited in
More Than 1,000 Suits," DISABILITY COMPLIANCE BULLETIN, LRP Publications, Aug. 15, 1996
(showing that data reflects a 27% increase of persons with severe disabilities in the work force
from 1991 to 1994). But cf. Rosen, supra note 94, at 18, 22 (suggesting that an increase in disabil-
ity benefits may discourage disabled persons from working).
168. Study is needed of the interaction of Title I to the 1996 Welfare Reform Law, for in-
stance, study of the impact on persons with disabilities of the requirement under welfare reform
that the head of families on welfare must work within two years or lose benefits. See Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. Law 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105; Collignon, supra note 6, at 137-38 (suggesting reduction in welfare dependency as indicator
of Title I implementation); cf. Rosen, supra note 94, at 28-29 (arguing that decreased labor force
participation and increasing insurance benefits of persons with disabilities is inconsistent with
Title I accommodation policies); Murray Weidenbaum, Why the Disabilities Act Is Missing its
Mark, CHISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 16, 1997, at 19 (arguing that negative trends in labor force
participation of people with disabilities are not related to Title I, but to other federal entitlement
programs, such as Supplemental Security Income, that provide monetary incentives for persons
with disabilities not to work). Further analysis is needed of the relation among changes in the
labor force participation of persons with different disabilities, Title I implementation, federal
work-related entitlement programs, and changes in general population and employment rates.
169. See Paul Wehman, Employment Opportunities and Career Development, in THE ADA
MANDATE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE 45, 54 (Paul Wehman ed., 1993) (citing a poll which indicated
that two-thirds of the people with disabilities are unemployed); see also JOHN McNEIL, U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION (1994) (reporting
that in 1994, for persons with disabilities between the ages of 21 to 64 years, roughly 14 million of
29 million individuals (48%) were unemployed; the mean monthly income for workers with disa-
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ies suggest that from the years 1970 to 1992, there has been no signifi-
cant net change in the labor force participation rate among persons
with disabilities. 170 As a result, the continued reality of economic,
structural, attitudinal, and behavioral discrimination' 7' increasingly
may lead qualified individuals to assert their Title I rights in the fu-
ture.172 Analysis of job retention, assessment, advancement, disclo-
sure, and accommodation strategies are needed to help qualified
individuals keep their jobs and achieve their potential. This analysis is
particularly important for those qualified individuals with severe disa-
bilities, who may be most susceptible to unfounded negative attitudes
about their labor force potential and value.173
Study must address the social and cultural factors, and the structural
and cyclical changes in the labor market and the economy, that influ-
ence employment opportunity for persons with and without different
disabilities. 74 This study may include factors such as the types of jobs
attained (for example, entry level, service-related, or production),
bilities was $1,713 compared to $2,160 for workers without disabilities). Additional study is
needed of this population, for instance, with regard to the nature of disability and the types of
jobs held by persons with and without disabilities. See DISABILITY WATCH, supra note 19, at 17
(summarizing national survey results regarding the employment status of people with disabilities
and suggesting that studies show no significant increases in their labor force participation since
1991); H. Stephen Kaye et al., Trends in Disability Rates in the United States, 1970-1994,17 DISA-
BtLITY STATISTICS ABSTRACT 1, 1-6 (Nov. 1996) (analyzing labor force rates and their relation to
work limitations and disability).
170. See Yelin, supra note 143, at 124-25 (finding a disproportionate increase in persons with
disabilities working part-time).
171. See SUPPORTED EMPLOYMENT: STRATEGIES FOR INTEGRATION OF WORKERS WITH Dis-
ABILITIES 54-58 (Paul Wehman et al. eds., 1992).
172. See Blanck & Marti, supra note 1 (detailing a longitudinal study from 1990 to 1995 track-
ing employment trends for several thousand persons with mental retardation finding that partici-
pants engaged in "self-advocacy" more likely to attain competitive employment and have higher
earned incomes); David Pfeiffer, 'We Won't Go Back. The ADA on the Grass Roots Level, 11
DISABILITY & SOC'y 271, 282-83 (1996) (finding members of the disability community reporting
empowerment and cynicism resulting from Title I implementation); William J. Hanna & Eliza-
beth Rogovsky, On the Situation of African-American Women with Physical Disabilities, 23 J.
APPLIED REHABILITATION COUNSELING 39, 39-45 (1992) (finding 25% of African-American
women with disabilities are employed full time, as compared to 77% of Caucasian men, 57% of
African-American men, and 44% of Caucasian women with disabilities); DISABILITY WATCH,
supra note 19, at 20 (citing N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (Louis
Harris & Assocs., Inc., ed., 1994)) (finding 30% of working-age adults with disabilities reported
experiencing job discrimination based on their disability).
173. See Baldwin, supra note 28, at 52 (suggesting that Title I may have little impact on equal
employment for persons with severe disabilities who are subject to the greatest discrimination in
the labor market); Marta W. Casper, Seasons of Change-The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Implementation in the Work Place, 17 J. REHABILITATION ADMIN. 129, 131-32 (1993) (describing
a qualitative study of employer attitudes about disability).
174. This study is needed given that many nondisabled individuals or members of their family
will experience a disabling condition during the course of their lifetime that affects their employ-
ment activities. See Blanck, supra note 4, at 918-19; Tom Harkin, The Americans with Disabili-
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amount of hours worked (for example, full time and temporary posi-
tions), geographic differences in labor markets and hiring patterns,
turnover, productivity, retention, wage, and promotion rates, availa-
bility of transportation to work, and provision of accommodations. 175
It may also include analysis of persons with disabilities who are partic-
ularly vulnerable to changes in economic conditions, such as those in
poverty, or those with minimal education or job skills. 176
Similar analysis is needed of cost-effective workplace accommoda-
tion strategies affecting qualified job applicants and employees with-
out disabilities, such as those geared toward employee wellness
programs, flexible hours for workers with young children, employer-
sponsored child care centers, job-sharing strategies for workers with
limited time availability, or employee assistance programs
("EAPs"). 77 As Martin Gerry has suggested, many companies al-
ready expend large sums of money accommodating the needs of work-
ers without disabilities, which in the aggregate may be substantially
greater than the costs associated with accommodations for qualified
workers with covered disabilities. 78 Analysis of these innovative
ties Act: Four Years Later-Commentary on Blanck, 79 IOWA L. REV. 935, 936 (1994) (noting
that disability is a natural part of the human experience).
175. See Jerry L. Mashaw & Virginia P. Reno, Overview, in DIsABILITY, WORK AND CASH
BENEFITS 22 (Jerry L. Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) (finding that structural changes in economy
affect job opportunities for workers with different disabilities); McNeil, supra note 169 (finding
wage disparities among workers with and without disabilities).
176. See Mary C. Daly, Who Is Protected by the ADA? Experience from the German Experi-
ence, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 101, 102 (1997) (arguing that many individuals
with disabilities are "doubly disadvantaged" by having a poor education or job skills).
177. See Tyler D. Hartwell et al., Aiding Troubled Employees: The Prevalence, Cost, and
Characteristics of Employee Assistance Programs in the United States, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
804, 804-08 (1996) (detailing a survey of 3,200 work sites finding 33% of employers with 50 or
more employees offer EAPs with median cost per eligible employee of $20, most commonly
addressing worker substance abuse, family problems, and emotional problems); cf. Karlan &
Rutherglen, supra note 82, at 39-40 (casting accommodation as "an individualized form of af-
firmative action" that may have applications for deterring employment discrimination based on
gender and race); Joan C. Williams, Restructuring Work and Family Entitlements Around Family
Values, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 753, 756 (1996) (suggesting that flexible work hours may
accommodate needs of workers with children in child care).
178. See Martin H. Gerry, Disability and Self-Sufficiency, in DISABILITY AND WORK: INCEN-
TIVES, RiGrrs, AND OPPORTUNITIES 89, 92 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991) (suggesting that large
businesses are increasingly investing in attracting and retaining qualified employees "in a more
holistic way" with disability as only one component of the measure of potential productivity and
value); U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 1992 National Survey of Worksite Health Pro-
motion Activities: Summary, 7 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 452, 452-64 (1993) (detailing a 1992
survey of 1,507 work sites which found that 81% of companies offered employee health promo-
tion activity). Likewise, many large companies are employing universal workplace and job site
design and access to include qualified individuals with and without disabilities into productive
work force participation in ways that add economic value to the company. See Daniel Stokols et
al., Integration of Medical Care and Worksite Health Promotion, 273 J. AM. MED. Assoc. 1136
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strategies may show that they effectively and efficiently complement
accommodations required by many qualified workers with disabilities.
For instance, studies show that workplace accommodation strate-
gies enhance the productivity and job tenure of those large numbers
of qualified workers without disabilities who are injured on the job or
who may become impaired in the future. 179 In an eight-year study of
Coors Brewing Company's health screening program covering almost
4,000 employees, the company realized net and direct savings of
roughly $2.5 million, in terms of saved payments in short-term disabil-
ity, temporary worker replacement, and direct medical costs. 180 Given
a conservative estimate of $100 average direct cost per employee for
workplace accommodations based on the Sears findings described ear-
lier, the savings generated by the Coors study could fund accommoda-
tions for 25,000 qualified workers.181
Another study of Coors Brewing Company's wellness initiatives
(for example, health screening and education, exercise, stress, and
smoking cessation programs) found that the company saves up to
eight dollars for every dollar invested in these programs. 182 Likewise,
a nine-year study of 28,000 Union Pacific Railroad employees found
that their wellness program resulted in net savings of $1.3 million to
the company.183 These findings suggest the huge economic implica-
tions associated with the development of cost-effective accommoda-
tions strategies designed to prevent workplace injury and to help
retain the increasing numbers of qualified employees with and without
disabilities. Considering that by the year 2000, the costs to employers
(1995) (finding that new technologies relate to cost-effective worksite wellness and health care
programs); SEARS II, supra note 10, at 6.
179. See, e.g., Hal Clifford, The Perfect Chemistry: DuPont's Work-Life Program, HEMI-
SPHERES 33, 34 (1996) (claiming a 637% return on expenditures for its LifeWorks program, a
program designed to help employees deal with job and life pressures, based on estimated value
of resulting increased performance, employee retention, stress reduction, and reduced
absenteeism).
180. Mary Greenwood & Joanne Henritze, Coorscreen: A Low Cost, On-Site Mammography
Screening Program, 10 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 364, 368 (1996) (noting that breast cancer
screening was provided for roughly 4,000 employees, cost savings of program was $3,110,080,
and procedural costs for the program were $668,690, with net savings of $2,441,190).
181. In 1995, it is estimated that companies spent over $100 billion rehabilitating 3.5 million
employees with work-related injuries. Shelly Reese, Building an Express Lane Back to Work, 14
Bus. & HEALTH 24, 24 (1996) (arguing that return-to-work programs and accommodation strate-
gies may ease worker rehabilitation costs).
182. See Martha McDonald, Valuing Experience: How To Keep Older Workers Healthy, 8
Bus. & HEALTH 35-38 (1990) (estimating that for older workers, stress control program could
save company $100,000 over a five-year period).
183. See Catherine Carythers, Will Wellness Ever Really Catch On?, Bus. & HEALTH: STATE
OF HEALTH CARE rN AMERICA SUPPLEMENT 55-58 (1996) (describing wellness programs on
stress, exercise, and eating habits).
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associated with back injury alone in the workplace are estimated to
approach $40 billion, examination of the economic savings related to
accommodation strategies, injury prevention, and wellness programs
is warranted. 184 Moreover, the educational side-effects associated
with Title I implementation and comprehensive accommodation strat-
egies may enhance general employee morale, as well as positive atti-
tudes about qualified co-workers with different disabilities or those
who are members of other protected groups.185
In conclusion, this Article has explored the economics of Title I im-
plementation. Clearly, further empirical study of Title I is needed to
address the law's economic, cultural, and symbolic impact on employ-
ers and others in society. The economic model has yet to demonstrate
empirically the hypothesized labor market inefficiencies associated
with the operation of the law, particularly those claimed to be linked
to the provision of workplace accommodations. Yet independent of
economic analysis and related disciplinary study of Title I, definition is
necessary of the social and moral policies underlying the equal em-
ployment of qualified persons with covered disabilities. 186
184. See Peter D. Blanck, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Issues for Back and Spine-
Related Disability, 19 SPINE 103, 103 (1994) (citing studies estimating that in 1990, the cost to
society of back-related disability included an estimated $16 billion in workers' compensation
costs, lost productivity, and other intangible costs).
185. Andrew t. Batavia, Ideology and Independent Living: Will Conservatism Harm People
with Disabilities?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 10, 20 (1997) (arguing that Title I
may be interpreted to require employers to accommodate the needs of employees with and
without disabilities, rather than an infringement on business objectives).
186. See Peter D. Blanck, Conceptions of Equality, Economic Efficiency and Affirmative Ac-
tion under ADA Title I (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript on file with author) (examining differing
views of Title I's reasonable accommodation provision); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 82, at
25 (concluding that "[tlhe prohibitions against discrimination and the requirements of accommo-
dation.., require more than efficiency and less than charity"); Gregory S. Kavka, Disability and
the Right to Work, 9 Soc. PHIL. & POL. 262, 288 (1992) (concluding that economic analysis
should not be sole criterion for defining social policy toward employment for qualified persons
with disabilities); Richard K. Scotch & Kay Schriner, Disability as Human Variation: Implica-
tions for Policy, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 148, 157 (1997) (arguing that disabil-
ity implicates social issues beyond those associated with discrimination and stigma).
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